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II.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from the trial court's order and judgment of June 7, 2007. This

Court lacks jurisdiction as Victor failed to timely file its lis pendens making Victor's lien
void. Utah appellate courts have ruled that failure to timely file a lis pendens divests the
court of jurisdiction. See Section D of Argument.

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS.
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations which pertain

to this appeal are identified in the Table of Authorities and are fully set forth in the body of
this brief.

IV.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Appellant, Victor Plastering, Inc. (hereinafter "Victor"), recorded its Notice

of Claim of Lien on the subject property with the Utah County Recorder's Office on or about
January 14, 2004. Victor recorded Amended Notices of Claim of Lien on April 13, 2004.
(R.05 and 298).
2.

Victor filed its Complaint on April 13, 2004. Such Complaint stated a claim

for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. (R.06 and 298).
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3.

Swanson Building Materials, Inc. (hereinafter "Swanson") was not named as

a Defendant in Victor's Complaint. (R.06 and 298).
4.

On February 3, 2006, Victor moved the trial court to file an Amended

Complaint. (R.69).
5.

The trial court granted leave to Victor to amend its Complaint. (R.72).

6.

Victor filed an Amended Complaint on or about February 10, 2006.

(Appellant's Br. Add. A and R.298).
7.

Swanson was first named as a party defendant to the case on or about February

10, 2006 in Victor's Amended Complaint. (Appellant's Br. Add. A and R.298).
8.

Victor's Amended Complaint was filed almost two (2) years after Victor's

Notice of Claim of Lien. (Appellant's Br. Add. A and R.298).
9.

For the first time, by its Amended Complaint, Victor alleged that Swanson held

"some claim of right, title or interest to the [subject] property." (Appellant's Br. Add. A, p.
3-4).
10.

Victor's prayer for relief contained in its Amended Complaint requested in

part:
3. That the Court adjudge that Plaintiffs Lien, attached hereto, is valid
and that Plaintiff is entitled to the amount stated in said Lien, plus Court costs,
reasonable attorney's fees, and interest at the rate and in the amount allowed
by contract and by law.

2
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7. For an order of foreclosure of the mechanic's lien recorded by
Plaintiff against the Property for the amount of $16,250.00 plus attorney's
fees, court costs, and accrued interest pursuant to statute.
(Appellant's Br. Add. A, p. 7-8).
11.

At no time did Victor file a lis pendens with the Utah County Recorder' s Office

in connection with this litigation (R.191).
12.

Swanson was served process in the underlying lawsuit on or about June 19,

2006. (R.79)
13.

At no time prior to being served with the Summons and Amended Complaint

did Swanson have actual knowledge of the existence of the lawsuit. (R.196 and R.298).

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Swanson had standing to contest the validity of Victor's lien simply as a party

defendant.

Swanson was not required to raise as an affirmative defense Victor's

noncompliance with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 because failure to comply with the statute
is not subject to waiver as it is jurisdictional. Victor's lien is void due to Victor's failure to
timely file its lis pendens. This Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction and should
dismiss the appeal.
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VI.

ARGUMENT

A.

INTRODUCTION
On February 15, 2007, the Fourth Judicial District Court granted Swanson's

Motion for Summary Judgment based on the following: (1) Victor did not name
Swanson in its initial complaint and failed to do so until nearly two (2) years after
recording notice of its claim of lien, and (2) Victor failed to meet its statutory burden to
prove that Swanson had actual knowledge of the lawsuit during the relevant time frame.
(R.299).
Victor filed a Motion for a New Trial against Swanson, wherein Victor alleged
that: (1) Swanson was not an interested party and had no basis to file an Answer; (2) the
trial court erred in concluding the lapse of Swanson's lien was immaterial to the trial
court's granting of summary judgment; (3) the trial court erred in ruling that Swanson's
failure to plead the alleged statute of limitations did not result in a waiver of such
defense; (4) the trial court erred in ruling that Victor's failure to file a lis pendens within
180 days of the filing of its mechanic's lien was jurisdictional (as opposed to failure to
file a legal action on the lien within 180 days), and (5) the Court erred in law in reversing
the burden of proof in a summary judgment proceeding, wherein it required that Victor
demonstrate Swanson had any actual notice of the commencement of the action. (R.315).

4
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In the trial court's Memorandum Ruling, dated May 9,2007, the trial court denied
Victor's Motion for a New Trial against Swanson finding that: (1) Swanson had an
interest in the matter if only because Victor had filed suit against Swanson; (2) the lapse
of Swanson's lien was immaterial as Victor had filed suit against Swanson and therefore
Swanson had standing to file a responsive pleading; (3) a party's failure to comply with
U.C.A. § 38-1-11 cannot be waived as an affirmative defense; (4) under U.C.A. § 38-111 (2) - (4)(b) a party's failure to file a lis pendens within 180 days of recording its
Notice of Lien divests a court from jurisdiction, and (5) under U.C.A. § 38-1-1 l(3)(b),
"the burden of proof is upon the lien claimant and those claiming under the lien claimant
to show actual knowledge under Subsection (3)(a)." (R.402).
As shall be demonstrated herein, the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment in favor of Swanson. The trial court's subsequent Order and Judgment,
entered on June 7, 2007, (R.416) should be affirmed.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT SWANSON HAD
STANDING TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF VICTOR'S LIEN.
Victor filed suit against Swanson alleging that Swanson held an interest in the

subject property. Victor further sought an award of attorney's fees and costs against
Swanson. The prayer for relief contained in the Amended Complaint reads in part:

5
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3. That the Court adjudge that Plaintiffs Lien, attached hereto, is
valid and that Plaintiff is entitled to the amount stated in said Lien, plus
Court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and interest at the rate and in the
amount allowed by contract and by law.
•

•

•

7. For an order of foreclosure of the mechanic's lien recorded by
Plaintiff against the Property for the amount of $ 16,250.00 plus attorney's
fees, court costs, and accrued interest pursuant to statute.
(Appellant's Br. Add. A, p. 7-8). Swanson was entitled to file a response to Victor's
Amended Complaint if only to clarify that Swanson was not liable to pay Victor's
attorney's fees and costs associated with the prosecution of its mechanic's lien.
In response to Victor's subsequent Motion for a New Trial on Swanson's Motion
for Summary Judgment, the trial court reaffirmed that Swanson had standing in this
matter. The Court indicated that:
Under Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah
1984), 'An admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial
admission and is normally conclusive on the party making
it.' This Court finds that Plaintiff [Victor] sued Swanson
and Plaintiff [Victor] cannot claim now that Swanson has
no interest and standing and cannot respond to the
complaint. For the same reasons this Court finds it
immaterial that Swanson's prior lien has lapsed.
(R.398).
Whether Swanson's prior lien had lapsed is immaterial as to whether Swanson
was entitled to file a responsive pleading. It is unreasonable to assert that a party lacks
standing to file a responsive pleading to a Complaint that prays for an award of
6
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attorney's fees against such party. Swanson clearly had a stake in the outcome of this
specific dispute. (See Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983)). The trial
court correctly ruled that Swanson was properly entitled to file a responsive pleading and
seek relief. (R.297). As such, this Court should affirm the trial court's award of
summary judgment in favor of Swanson.
C.

SWANSON DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO RAISE VICTOR'S
UNTIMELY ACTION UNDER THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE.
A party's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 is not subject to

waiver as it is jurisdictional. See Pearson v. Lamb, 121 P.3d 717, 722 (Utah Ct. App.
2005); Projects Unlimited Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738 (Utah
1990); Knight v. Post 748 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Projects
Unlimited J n c , the Court indicates that "The commencement requirement of section 381-11 serves as a substantive restriction on the lien action and, unlike a true statute of
limitation, is not waived if not pleaded." Id. at 751, citing AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree
Dev. & Energy. Co.. 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986).
Victor misapplies Projects Unlimited, Inc.. by claiming that such decision stands
for the proposition that a failure to file as required by Section 38-1-11 is not
jurisdictional. However, there is a critical distinction between the facts of that case and
the present matter. Swanson had no actual knowledge of the action. (R. 196 and R.298).
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1.

Swanson Had No Actual Knowledge of the Commencement of the
Action,

U.C.A. § 38-1-1 l(2)(b) expressly states that "the burden of proof shall be upon
the lien claimant and those claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge."
As amended, U.C.A. § 38-1-1 l(3)(b) provides "the burden of proof is upon the lien
claimant and those claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge under
Subsection (3)(a)". The trial court correctly ruled that Victor bore the burden of proof
to demonstrate that Victor was entitled to the lien and that it had complied with the
provisions of U.C.A. § 38-1-11.
Utah courts hold that constructive notice or inquiry notice cannot serve as a
substitute for actual notice. See Interlake Distribs., Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d
1295, 1297 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Even assuming that a defendant had constructive or
inquiry notice of pending litigation, such notice of litigation does not meet the
requirement that a defendant receive actual notice of the lien. See Id. at 1298-1299.
Victor failed to demonstrate that Swanson had actual knowledge of the commencement
of the action as required by U.C.A. § 38-1-1 l(3)(b). (R.296-298). Indeed, Swanson
submitted sworn testimony that Swanson had no actual knowledge of the commencement
of the action until June of 2006, nearly two (2) years after Victor's recording notice of
its claim of lien. (R.196 and R.298).
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Swanson based on the fact
that a lien claimant must file a lis pendens within 180 days from the date on which the
lien claimant filed a notice of claim. (R.297). Failure to do so renders the lien void
"except as to persons who have been made parties to the action and persons having
actual knowledge of the commencement of the action." Id. The trial court concluded that
Swanson was not subject to the lien, or lien foreclosure, because it is undisputed that the
lis pendens was not timely filed, and Swanson had no knowledge of the lawsuit during
the relevant time frame. Id.
Victor argues that Swanson waived its right to raise Victor's void lien as a
defense as it was not raised in its Answer. However, Victor's noncompliance with
U.C.A. § 38-1-11 resulted in the invalidation and voiding of its lien. There is no issue
of claim preclusion as with a traditional statute of limitations. An invalid or void lien,
unlike a true statute of limitations, is not waived if such invalidation is not pled.
Pearson, 121 P.3d at 722. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that Victor's
untimely action was not subject to waiver, but was jurisdictional. (R.297).
D,

THE APPELLATE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION AND SHOULD
ACCORDINGLY DISMISS THIS APPEAL.
A Complaint to foreclose a mechanic's lien must be filed within 180 days from

the date the Notice of Claim of Lien was recorded in the appropriate county recorder's
office. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1). The statute indicates that:
9

SWAN 136

Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1)
[180 days after notice of claim of lien], the lien claimant
shall file for record with the county recorder of each county
in which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the
action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title
or right to possession of real property, or the lien shall be
void, except as to person who have been made parties to the
action and persons having actual knowledge of the
commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(2)(a).
A lien claimant must file notice of the pendency (lis pendens) of the action within
180 days from the date on which the lien claimant filed a notice of claim with the
appropriate county recorder. U.C.A. § 38-1-11(1 )-(2). Failure to do so renders the lien
void "except as to persons who have been made parties to the action and persons having
actual knowledge of the commencement of the action." U.C.A. § 38-1-1 l(2)(a). Thus,
an interested party is not subject to a lien where a lis pendensjs not timely filed and the
party had no knowledge of the lawsuit during the relevant time frame.

Projects

Unlimited Inc.. 798 P.2d at 751.
A party's failure to file a timely lis pendens.cannot be remedied and is fatal to its
case. Parties that were not timely named in the action and that lacked actual knowledge
of the lien are not subject to the Court's jurisdiction. See Pearson, 121 P.3d at 717. See
also Projects Unlimited, Inc., 798 P.2d at 751. Once a lien is void, the court lacks
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jurisdiction over the matter. See Pearson, 121 P.3d at 722. In Pearson, the Utah Court
of Appeals addressed this issue and concluded that:
Utah courts have thus ruled that failure to timely commence
a mechanic's lien foreclosure action and file a lis pendens,
like failure to timely notify the state of a claim against it,
divests the court of jurisdiction.
Id. citing Interlake Distribs., Inc., 954 P.2d at 1297-99 (holding that liens were void
because plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens); Diehl Lumber Transp. Inc. v. Mickelson,
802 P.2d 739,742 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Failure to commence a timely mechanics' lien
foreclosure action divests the court ofjurisdiction."); AAA Fencing Co., 714 P2d at 290291 (holding that an untimely mechanics' lien action is a jurisdictional issue and
"forecloses [the parties'] rights").
The Utah Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in Foothill Park, LC v.
Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113. In Foothill Park, LC, the Court confirmed that a trial
court has no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a lien "once the lien right is
extinguished." Id. at ^ 6, citing Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(b). The Court held that,
because the plaintiff had failed to enforce its lien right within the time provided by the
statute, the trial court was therefore divested of jurisdiction to adjudicate the lien. Id. at
Tj 10. In fact, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal based on this very issue. The
Court concluded that:

11
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Because Judston's lien right became void when it was not
enforced within 180 days of the first notice, we lack
jurisdiction to further adjudicate the liens pursuant to
section 38-1-1 l(4)(b). Accordingly, we dismiss Judston's
appeal on this issue.
Id. at Tf 17. This recent case reaffirms the longstanding rule that "An untimely action
under [Section 38-1-11] is jurisdictional and forecloses the parties' rights." Id. at Tf 13.
See also Knight 748 P.2d at 1100; Pearson, 121 P.3d at 722; Projects Unlimited, Inc.,
798P.2dat738.
In accordance with said longstanding rule, the trial court appropriately granted
summary judgment in favor of Swanson because a lien claimant must file a lis pendens
within 180 days from the date on which the lien claimant filed a notice of claim. (R.297).
Referring to Section 38-1-1 l(2)(a) of the Mechanics Liens Statute, the trial court noted
that a failure to do so renders the lien void "except as to persons who have been made
parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the
action." (R.297). The trial court concluded that Swanson was not subject to the lien, or
lien foreclosure, because it is undisputed that the lis pendens was not timely filed and
Swanson had no knowledge of the lawsuit during the relevant time frame. (R.297).
Accordingly, this Court should either affirm the trial court's ruling or dismiss this appeal
for lack of jurisdiction.
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E.

SWANSON IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. 31-1-18.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, a successful party may be entitled to

recover its reasonable attorney's fee on an action brought to enforce any lien. See also
Foothill Park, LC, 2008 UT App 113 at ^f 21. Swanson has been forced to incur and
continues to incur substantial attorney's fees. Accordingly, Swanson requests an award
of attorney's fees and costs expended in the underlying action and this appeal.

VII.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should dismiss the appeal based on a lack of

jurisdiction. Should the Court review the case, the Court should affirm the trial court's
final Order and Judgment entered in favor of Swanson on June 7, 2007. (R.416).
Regardless, Swanson should be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18.
DATED this Iffi^day of May, 2008.
RICHER & OVERHOLT, P.C.

Arnold Richer
Darci D. Tolbert
Attorneys for Swanson Building Materials,
Inc.
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